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abstraCt  
In this paper, we apply two types of automatic balance mechanism 
(ABM) to the French first pillar pension system for private sector 
employees (CNAV). One is based on a tax gap ratio (TGR-ABM) 
and the other is the smooth ABM (S-ABM) developed by Gannon, 
Legros and Touzé (2013). Two long-run forecast scenarios 
over the period 2014–2063 are analysed. The first is optimistic 
(“benchmark”) and assumes a 4.5% unemployment rate and a 
1.5% productivity growth rate in the long run. The second is more 
pessimistic (“prudent”), with a 7.5% unemployment rate and a 
1% productivity growth rate in the long run. For the benchmark 
(respectively prudent) scenario, a TGR-ABM requires, now and for 
the next 50 years, a 2.8% (respectively 6.3%) decrease in pensions 
and a 2.9% (respectively 6.7%) increase in the tax rate. An S-ABM 
requires, for the benchmark (respectively prudent) scenario, an 
immediate 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) decrease in pensions and a 1.4% 
(respectively 3.5%) increase in the tax rate. In the long run (50 years), 
an S-ABM requires a 4.5% (respectively 9.1%) reduction in pensions 
and a 4.5% (respectively 9.1%) increase in the tax rate.
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1 introduCtion
The French pension system for private sector employees is based on two pillars. The first pillar is a basic 
social security plan (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse, CNAV). It is a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) scheme 
that provides pensions on a defined benefit rule. The pension is proportional to the average wage computed 
over 25 years (“reference wage”), based on wages bounded by a maximum, called the “social security 
ceiling” (see appendix). The second pillar includes two additional schemes: ARRCO for all workers and 
AGIRC for executives. Both pay pensions on a defined contribution rule and are also pay-as-you-go 
pension schemes. These two pillars are operated under different rules. The CNAV is managed by the social 
security administration, whereas the second pillar schemes are managed by social partners, but some 
parameter changes of the complementary pension schemes (for instance, the pensionable age) are directly 
governed by the social security system.
Significant deficits in these plans stem from the current economic crisis (lower growth combined 
with higher unemployment). However, these deficits arose well before expected as a result of the ageing of 
population.
In France, pension reform is subject to a harsh political debate (Blanchet & Legros 2002), which often 
leads governments to adopt reforms only when they no longer have a choice. These ad hoc reforms (Turner 
2009) induce inconsistency in the choice of pension funding. This blurs the planning of their future by 
different generations of workers because they do not know how their contribution rates and pension 
amounts will be changed. To tackle this problem, automatic adjustment mechanisms (AAMs) could be 
implemented, relying on rules (Turner 2009) that define how different pension calculation parameters 
must be adapted according to changes in observed variables (for example, life expectancy, consumer price 
index). When these adjustments fail to ensure financial sustainability, it may be wise to follow countries 
such as Sweden (Settergren 2001; Capretta 2006; Andrews 2008; Vidal-Melia et al 2009; Scherman 2011; 
Gannon et al. 2013; Sakamoto 2013) and to use an automatic balance mechanism (ABM).
This paper proposes to assess how the use of ABMs could guarantee the solvency of the CNAV.
Section 2 outlines CNAV’s financial forecasts up to 50 years. Two scenarios will be analysed, one, 
optimistic; the other more conservative one. These will mainly be used in order to generate the data 
required for the second part of the paper.
Section 3 is dedicated to the use of ABMs. First, we present a way to address the issue of long-
term credit through the concept of unfunded obligations, such as defined by the US Social Security 
administration, and the concept of tax gap ratio. Next, two types of ABM are used. One is based on a tax 
gap ratio (TGR-ABM), the other is an application of the smooth ABM (S-ABM) developed by Gannon 
et al (2013). Compared with using a tax gap ratio, using an S-ABM allows for a gradual adjustment in the 
contribution rates and the pension levels. However, the drawback of this implementation is that it distorts 
the principle of generational equality. In effect, the S-ABM relies on a parameter of public preference for 
present. That can be viewed as a kind of procrastination.
2 two sCenarios For the Future oF the First piLLar pensions 
sCheme oF priVate seCtor empLoYees (CnaV)
Structurally, two main macroeconomic variables have significant impact on the solvency of CNAV 
pension scheme: the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate. We briefly describe the mechanisms at 
stake and the forecast built on two scenarios.
Unemployment rate (Figure 1a) is usually thought to play a crucial role in financial balancing through 
the increase in contributions.
This is true in the short run, because receipts increase when the unemployment rate decreases but, in 
the long run, the net effect may be ambiguous. First, according to the Phillips curve (Phillips 1958), which 
historically shows an inverse relationship between unemployment and wage increase rates, a decrease in 
the unemployment rate implies an increase in wages. This, in turn, increases the short-run effect on overall 
contributions. Second, in the long run, pension liability depends upon careers and, therefore, lifelong 
wages. Then, pension liability increases as the unemployment rate decreases.
As far as France is concerned, the 2003 reform (see appendix for the details) puts an end to the 
independence of unemployment insurance and the pension system by stipulating that the surplus of 
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unemployment insurance (UI, hereafter) adds to the financing of the pension scheme, if required. This 
introduces a clear and positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the pension scheme balance.
When the unemployment rate falls below a 7% threshold (Hamayon & Legros 2007), the UI generates 
a surplus. It follows that a wise forecaster should be cautious in his assumption of long-run unemployment 
rate, to avoid any overestimate of the pension scheme resource resulting from a possible UI surplus.
The economic growth rate (Figure 1b) is also a crucial variable. In the case of positive economic growth 
rate, expenditures grow less than receipts. This is due to the pension rules (see appendix): both the wages 
used for the “reference wage” and pensions are indexed on inflation and not on the economic growth rate. 
This indexing rule helps improve the balance of the pension scheme as soon as the nominal economic 
growth exceeds the inflation rate. The part played by the productivity growth rate (Figure 1b) to balance the 
pension scheme would be inoperative if the pensions and reference wages were indexed on the nominal wages 
(supposed to be indexed on the economic growth rate). However, with such a rule, retirees’ purchasing power 
would be maintained. In other words, when benefits are adjusted according to changes in the consumer price 
index, retirees pay an implicit tax, thus improving the pension scheme’s financial balance.
This paper suggests two scenarios, simulations of which are based on a demo-economic model with a 
detailed description of the French pension scheme (Hamayon & Legros 2001).
The first scenario (the “benchmark”) is based upon the double assumption of a low unemployment rate 
(4.5% after 2030) and a productivity rate of 1.5% (Figure 1). This scenario is similar to the government’s, 
which is worked out by the Conseil d’orientation des retraites (COR, Pension Orientation Council, which 
reports to the Prime Minister).
The second scenario tests an alternative and more conservative approach, described hereafter as 
“prudent” (Figure 1). It assumes that the unemployment rate will progressively reach 7.5% in 2030 and 
that the productivity growth rate will remain at 1% (as forecast by Artus & Caffet 2013). These different 
assumptions appear in Figure 1 showing that the “pessimistic” alternative scenario is directly determined 
by trend observation.
Figure 1: Two 
macroeconomic 
scenarios 
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The results (Figure 2) are twofold and, of course, highly contrasted. First, the impact of the unemployment 
rate is confirmed. In the benchmark scenario (with a low unemployment rate), the sharp decrease – less 
than 7% – in the unemployment rate after 2020 leads to a large transfer from the unemployment insurance 
scheme towards the pensions: this transfer reaches 2.2 points of UI contribution, or 18 billion constant euros 
(B€).1 The overall deficit of the pension scheme is nearly nil after 2020.
Second, in the case of a lower economic growth (and higher unemployment rate), the situation is far 
more pessimistic. The higher unemployment rate prohibits any transfer from the UI towards the pension 
scheme. The deficit of the basic pension scheme reaches 14.4 B€ in 2050.
Figure 2 summarises the results. In the benchmark scenario, the decrease in the unemployment rate 
allows a significant transfer from the UI towards the pension scheme (11.5 B€ in 2030 and 18.2 B€ in 2050), 
which pushes up the balance from the continuous bold line to the dotted one. In the “prudent” scenario, 
due to a higher unemployment rate, the transfers between the UI scheme towards the first pillar pension 
scheme are nil and the balance remains highly negative throughout the considered period. 
Reading from these forecasts, our simulations provide both receipts and expenditures of the pension 
regime, to be used in the next section.
3 impLementinG automatiC baLanCe meChanisms
We define hereafter two central concepts to evaluate the long-run insolvency of the pension system: the 
“unfunded obligations” and the tax gap ratio. These measures are then used to build two examples of ABMs.
3.1 Evaluating long-run solvency
3.1.1 Notations
In this paper, for sake of simplicity, we present a non-stochastic approach to ABMs. All our computations 
are based upon given forecast values of receipts and expenditures. That means that the estimated 
adjustment variables must be considered as forecast values for the current period. That also means that 
these variables will have to be revised as the forecasts will adjust with time.
At the current period (
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with 0=0F  (see appendix) the financial amount accumulated in the retirement reserve fund. 
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number of deficit periods: the initial capital requirements increase with the length of the 
solvency guarantee.
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solvency guarantee.
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3.2.1 Main issues about ABM 
The purpose of an ABM is to work out the following problem: how to adjust the expenditures 
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We introduce two adjustment time factors – tA  and tB  – applying respectively to 
payroll tax rate and pension benefits at time t . Devising an ABM consists in designing a time 
path: tt EXPA ×  and tt RECB × .
As an illustration, consider Sweden, a pioneer country in adopting an ABM. Its solvency 
concept is carried by a notional asset-liability approach. The pension amount is the unique 
adjustment variable: hence, tA  is constrained to 1 and only tB  adjusts. In comparison, in 
France, where official forecasts are based on the optimistic assumption, the transfer from UI 
can be interpreted as substituting the pension payroll tax by UI payroll tax. If the official 
assumption proves true, then the sustainability of the CNAV is guaranteed, since the 
government implicitly adopts a payroll tax adjustment such that 1>tA  and 1=tB .
3.2.2 ABMs based on the TGR  
Here, we suggest using the TGR  to design a simple ABM (denoted TGR-ABM). When 0,=0F  
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These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
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In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 for a full adjustment by the payroll t x  (5)
or 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjustment by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to th  TGR . The following p rmanen  solutio s are th n anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
, for a full adjustment by the pension amou t.  (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by allowing for a possible 
trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pe sio . To this eff ct, we introduce a tax gap elasticity 
parameter 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  or a ull adju tm nt by the payroll ax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full a justment by tax or by p nsion. To this effect, we
introduce a tax gap elasticity par me r α  which weights the degree f adjustm t by
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The foll wing permanent solution re then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the valu  of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the s nsivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in th  benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In th  wo 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), th  djustments by receipt  A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectiv ly 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fac  that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average faster than xpenditures during the first decad .
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 which eights t e degr e of adjustment by pension. The value 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on t  tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
llowing for a possibl  trad -off betwe n full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
i troduce a tax gap elasticity par met  α  which weights the degre  f adjustment by 
pensi n. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following p rmanent solutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In Fra ce, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can b directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
diff rent values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resp spectiv ly by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
resp ct to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
d rea ing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
r ceipts to grow (on av rage) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 (respectively 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the p nsion amount. (6)
These change , based on the tax gap, can be ext nded to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off be ween full adjus ment by tax or by pension. To this eff ct, we 
intr uce a t  gap lastici y parameter α  whic  weights h  degr e of adjustment by 
p si n. Th  value α−1  ( )α−lresp ctiv  defines the elastici y of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent solutions are then a ticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the r serv  funds ca be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly sed to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the s nsivit ty of the adjustments to ime horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scen rios (b chmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectively b  pensions, B ) describe a decr asing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to ti  horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These r sults illustra e he fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to he forecast horizon (i  years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 
defin s the elasticity of the adjustment factor 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to ixed j stments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjust ent by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the la icity of th  djustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent solutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the s nsivitity of the adjustm nts to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in ye rs): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
(resp ctively 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjust ent by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjustment by 
p sion. he value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . Th  following permanent solutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 to the 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be extend d to mixed a justments, by
al owing f r  possible trade-off betw en full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we
introduce a t x gap elasticity parameter α which weights the d gr e of adjustment by
pensi . The value α−1  ( )α−lyresp ctive  defin s the elasticity of the adjustment factor A
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent solutions are th n anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserv  funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate th  values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 resp ctively depict the sen ivitity of the adjustments to time horiz n for
different values of α in the b nchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfer  and prudent), he adjustments by receipts A
(respresp ctively b  pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (resp ctively increasing) relation with 
resp ct to ime horiz n for 10.<T  The r lation becomes increasing (resp.resp ctively 
decreasing) for a longer horiz n. These r sult  illustrate the fact tha  past reforms cause 
receipts to gr w (on average) faster han exp nditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with resp ct to the forecast horiz n (i  years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 The following perman nt 
so utions are then anticipated: 
 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 o  
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment b  the pension am unt. (6)
T se ch ges, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments  by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjustment by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The followi g permanent soluti s are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resp i l  by pensions, B ) describe a ecreasi g (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time orizon for 10.<T  The relation b comes increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a lo ger horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than x nditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae can be directly 
used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensitivity of the adjustments to time horizon for different values 
of 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
Th se changes, based on the t x gap, can be ext nded t  mix d djustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introd ce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the d gr e of adjustment by 
pension. The valu  α−1  ( )α−lyespective  defines th  el stic ty of the adju tmen  factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The followi g permanent solutions are then anticipa ed: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In Fr nce, the reserve funds can be considered as n l (see appen ix), so hese f mulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adj stments by rec ipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The relation becomes increasi g (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past r forms cause 
receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decad .
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
 in the b nchmark scenario and the pruden  scena io. In the two scenarios (benchmark without UI 
transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a f ll adjustm nt by the p n ion mount. (6)
These changes, based on the tax gap, can be ext nd d to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible trade-off between full adjustment by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjustment by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent olutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil ( e appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustm nts to ti e horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by rec ipts A  
(resprespectively by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The r lation becom s increasing (resp.respectively 
decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past eforms aus  
receipts to grow (o  average) faster tha  expenditures during the first cade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchm rk scenario 
(without IU transfers)  
(respectively by pensions, 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for a full adjustment by the payroll tax (5)
 or
,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a f ll adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
Th se ch nges, based on the tax gap, can be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a po sible trade-off b tween full adjustm t by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which w ights t  degree f adjustment by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the elasticity of the adjustment factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent solutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be considered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to esti ate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figur s 4 and 5 r spectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
differe t values of α  in the benchmark scenario and the prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI transfers and prudent), the adjustments by receipts A  
(resprespectiv ly by pensions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectively increasing) relation with 
respect to time horizon for 10.<T  The rela ion becomes incr sing (r sp.resp ctively 
d reasing) for a longer horizo . Th se results illustrate the fact that past reforms caus  
receipt  t  grow (on aver ge) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with respect to the forecast horizon (in years): benchmark scenario 
(witho t IU transfers)  
) describe a decreasing 
(respectively incr asing) relation with respect to t me horizon for 
 ,= 0TGRtt ×
∗ ττ  for  full dj stment by the payroll tax (5)
 or 
 ,= 10
−∗ ×TGRpp tt  for a full adjustment by the pension amount. (6)
These cha ge , based on the tax g , ca  be extended to mixed adjustments, by 
allowing for a possible tr de-off between full adjust ent by tax or by pension. To this effect, we 
introduce a tax gap elasticity parameter α  which weights the degree of adjustment by 
pension. The value α−1  ( )α−lyrespective  defines the el sticity of the adjustm t factor A  
(resp. )B  to the TGR . The following permanent solutions are then anticipated: 
 



−
−
α
α
0
1
0
=
=
TGRB
TGRA
t
t  (7)
In France, the reserve funds can be co sidered as nil (see appendix), so these formulae 
can be directly used to estimate the values of these TGR-ABM.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively depict the sensivitity of the adjustments to time horizon for 
different values of α  in the benchmark scenario and th  prudent scenario. In the two 
scenarios (benchmark without UI ransfers and prudent), the adjustme ts by r ceipts A  
(respr spectively by pe sions, B ) describe a decreasing (respectiv ly increasing) relation with 
r spect to time horiz n for 10.<T  Th  relation becomes increasing (resp.respectively 
decr asing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms cause 
receipts to gro  (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
Figure 4: TGR-ABM with esp ct to the forecast horiz n (in ye rs): b nchma k sc nario 
(without IU transfer )  
 The relation becomes 
increasing (r pectively decreasing) for a longer horizon. These results illustrate the fact that past reforms 
cause receipts to grow (on average) faster than expenditures during the first decade.
The graphs also show the sensitivity of the adjustm nt vari bles with espec  to 
a. Tax r te adjusm ts: A b. Pe  adj sments: B
Figure 5: TGR-ABM with respect to the for cast orizon (in years): prudent scenario 
a. Tax rate adjusme ts: A b. Pens on adju m nts: B
The graphs also show the ensitivity of th  djus m nt variables with resp ct to α .
There a  two limit values – 1=α  and 0=α  – meaning  full adju tment through pensions 
and contributions respectively. Considering a 50-year horizo , a 5.5% permanent decline in 
pension is required in the first case ( 1=α ), as against a 5.8% permanent i crease n 
contributions in the second case. Wit  the sam  time horizon and an intermediate v lu  of 
0.5=α , fina cial solvency requires a 2.8% permanent reduction in pensio s coupled with  
2.9% permanent increase in con ibutions.
3.2.3 S-ABM: smooth automatic balance mechanism 
Using an ABM derived from a tax gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, 
because it induces an immediate and permanent adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution 
may require devising a smooth, gradual adjustment in contribution rates and pension levels. To 
. There are wo limit 
values – 
a. Tax rate adjusments: A b. Pension adjusments: B
Figur  5: TGR-ABM with respect t  the forecast horizon (in years): pr d nt scenario 
a. Tax rate adjusments: A b. Pension adjusments: B
The graphs also show the sensitivity of the adju tment variables with r spect t  α . 
There are two limit values – 1=α  and 0=α  – meaning a full adjustment through pensions 
and contributions respectively. Considering  50-year horizon, a 5.5% permanent decline in 
pension is required in the first case ( 1=α ), as against a 5.8% permanent increase in 
contributions in the second case. With the same time horizon and an intermediate value of 
0.5=α , financial solvency requires a 2.8% permanent reduction in pensions coupled with a 
2.9% permanent increase in contributions.
3.2.3 S-ABM: smooth automatic balance mechanism 
Using an ABM derived from a tax gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, 
because it induces an immediate and permanent adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution 
may require devising a smooth, gradual adjustment in contribution rates and pension levels. To 
 and 
a. Tax rate djusments: A b. Pension adjusments: B
Figure 5: TGR-ABM with respect to he forecast horizo  (in years): pru t s n rio 
a. Tax rate adjusments: A b. Pension adjusments: B
he graphs also sh w the sensitivity of the adjust ent v ri bles with respect to α . 
There are two lim t values – 1=α  and 0=α  – meaning a full djustment through p nsions 
nd contributions r spectively. Considering a 50-year horizon, a 5.5% permane t decline in 
pension is required in the first case ( 1=α ), as ag inst a 5.8% permane t increase in 
contributions in the second case. With t e same time horizon and an i termediate value of 
0.5=α , fina cial solvency requires a 2.8% permane t reduction i pensions coupled with a 
2.9% permane t increase in contributions.
3.2.3 S-ABM: smooth automatic balance mechanism 
Using an ABM derived from a t x gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, 
because it induces an immediate and permane t adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution 
may require devising a smooth, gradual djustment in contribution rates and pension lev ls. To 
– meani g a full adjustmen  through pensions and c tributio s respectively. 
Considering a 50-year horizon, a 5.5% permanent decline in pension is required in the first case (
a. Tax r te adjusment : A b. Pension adjusments: B
Figure 5: TGR-ABM with respect to th  forecast horiz  (in years): prudent scenario 
a. Tax rate adjusments: A b. Pension adjusments: B
The graphs als  show the s sitivity of the adjustment variabl s with respect to α . 
There are two limit values – 1=α  and 0=α  – meaning a full adjustment through pensions 
and contributions respectively. Considering a 50-year horizon, a 5.5% permanent decline in 
pension is r quired in the first case ( 1=α ), as against a 5.8% permanent increase in 
contributions in the second case. With the same time horizon and an intermediate value of 
0.5=α , financial solvency requires a 2.8% permanent reduction in pensions coupled with a 
2.9% permanent increase in contributions.
3.2 3 S-ABM: smooth automatic balance mechanism 
Using an ABM de iv d f om a tax gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, 
because it induces n immediate and permanent adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution 
may require devising a smooth, gradual adjustment in contribution rates and pension levels. To 
),  
as against a 5.8% permanent increase in contributions in the second case. With the sam  time horizon and 
an intermediate value of 
a. Tax ra e adjusments: A b. Pens on adjusmen s: B
Figure 5: TGR-ABM with respect to he forecast horizon (in years): prudent scenario 
a. Tax rate djusments: A b. Pension adjus ts: B
The graphs also show the sensitivity of the adjustment variables with respect to α . 
There are two limit values – 1=α  and 0=α  – m aning a full adju tment through pensio s 
and contributions resp ctiv ly. Conside ing a 50-year horizon, a 5.5% permanent decli e in 
ension is r quired in the first ase ( 1=α ), as against a 5.8% erma t incr ase in 
contributions in th  s cond cas . Wi  the ame time horizon and an intermediate value of 
0.5=α , financi l olvency req ires a 2.8% p rmanent reduction in pe sions coupl d with  
2.9% p rmanent inc as  in contributions.
3.2.3 S-ABM: sm th autom t c balanc  mechanism
Using an ABM derived from a tax gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, 
because it induces an immediate and permanent adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution 
m y require devising a smoot , gradual adjustment in contribution rates and pension levels. To 
, fi ancial solvency r quir s a 2.8% permane t reduc io  in pensions 
coupl d with a 2.9% perman nt incre se i  contribution .
38 australian JOurnal OF actuarial PracticE   ❙   2014   ❙   Volume 2     
3.2.3  S-ABM: smooth automatic balance mechanism
Using an ABM derived from a tax gap ratio can be politically and socially difficult to apply, because it 
induces an immediate and permanent adjustment. To bypass this obstacle, a solution may require devising 
a smooth, gradual adjustment in contribution rates and pension levels. To this effect, Gannon et al. (2013) 
build a model based on dynamic programming called “smooth automatic balance mechanism” (S-ABM). 
The “socio-political” sensitivity to changes in legislation is apprehended by a quadratic loss function.  
The distortion cost of the receipts (resp. of the expenditures) is given a weighting2 
this effect, Gannon et al. (2013) build a model based on dynamic programming called “smooth 
automatic balance mechanism” (S-ABM). The “socio-political” sensitivity to changes in 
legislation is apprehended by a quadratic loss function. The distortion cost of the receipts (resp. 
of the expenditures) is given a weighting2 α  (resp. )1 α− . At period ,t  the loss function ( tLF
) can be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .111= 22 −⋅−+−⋅ ttt BALF αα  (8)
For a forecast horizon ,T  the S-ABM aims to match the sum of discounted receipts with 
the sum of discounted expenditures: 
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The authors assume that the social planner has a time preference. By denoting δ  the 
public preference for present rate, the dynamic program to optimise is: 
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 The first order conditions lead to the initial optimal values 1A  and 1B , which are 
functions of the unfunded obligations: 
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 The dynamics of the adjustment factors can be inferred for 2≥t : 
2 For the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation as that used for the TGR adjustments because in the presentation of simulation results, 
the parameter values are the same for the two ABMs: TGR and S-ABM.
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) can be w itten as follows: 
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the sum of di co nted expenditures: 
 ( ) .=
1=1=
0
1=1= i
t
i
tt
T
ti
t
i
tt
T
t R
EXPBF
R
RECAI
Π
⋅
+
Π
⋅ ∑∑  (9)
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 The first order conditions lead o the initial optimal values 1A and 1B , which are
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 The dynamics of the adjustment factors can be inferred for 2≥t : 
2 For the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation as that used for the TGR adjustments because in the presentatio of simulation results, 
the parameter valu s are th  same for th wo ABMs: TGR and S-AB .
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We consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
reference values of parameters: 50=0.5,= Tα  and 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
increase. This is dramatically illustrated by the dynamics of the reserve fund. For the benchmark 
scenario, it increases from zero (right vertical axis) to reach in 2026 a maximum of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pension scheme yields a surplus. Then it decreases – deficit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second period of surplus – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the “prudent” scenario: in 
2030 it reaches a maximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of about –27 B€ in 2057. This 
difference is due to the fact that, in order to comply with a less optimistic forecast, [contributors 
must]  “save” larger amounts of money.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• lower public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost through receipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public preference for the present rate ( 0%=δ ) increases the cost of 
procrastination. It results in stronger adjustments in the short run and weaker adjustments in 
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We consid r two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figur  6a and 7  provide th  simul tions for the 
reference values of paramet rs: 50=0.5,= Tα  nd 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectiv ly 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments rea h 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectiv ly 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
increase. This is dramatically illustrated by the dynamics of the reserve fund. For the be chmark 
scenario, it increases from z ro (right vertical xis) to reach in 2026 a max mum of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pensi n scheme yields a surplus. Then it decreases – def cit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second eriod of surplus – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the “prudent” cenario: in 
2030 it reaches a maximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of bout –27 B€ in 2057. This 
difference is due to the fact that, in order to comply with a less optimistic forecast, [c ntri utors 
must]  “save” larger amou ts of money.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• lower public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost throu h receipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horiz n with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public preference for the present rate ( 0%=δ ) increases the cost of 
procrastination. It results in str nger adjustments in the shor  run and weaker adjustments in 
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W  consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
ref r nce values of par m t rs: 50=0.5,= Tα  a d 2.5%=δ . Ass ming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scen rio, Figure 6a (r sp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
im ediate adjustments im ly both a 1.5% (resp c ively 3.6%) red ction i p nsions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, thes  adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respect vely 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6 3 pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax r te 
increase. This i  dramatically illustr ed by the dynamics of the r s rve fund. For the benchmark 
scenario, it increase  from zero (right ve tical xis) to reach in 20 6 a maxi um of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pension scheme yields a surplus. T en it decrea e  – deficit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally gr ws ag in – second period of surplus – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a l rger range prevails in the “prudent” scenario: in 
203  it reaches a maximum of about 9  B€ and a mini um of bout –27 B€ in 2057. T is
differ nce is due to the fact that, in order to co ply with a less optimist c forecast, [contribut rs 
must]  “save” larger amounts of mon y.
We evaluate three par metric vari nts:
• lower public pref r nce for the pres nt rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost through rec ipts it  0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon ith 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public pref r nce for the pres nt rate ( 0%=δ ) increase  the cost of 
procrastination. It results in stronger adj stments in the short un and weaker adjustments in 
. Assuming the benchmark (respectively pr dent) scena io, 
Figure 6a (respectively Figure 7a) shows that immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) 
reduction in pensions and a 1.4% (respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments 
reach 4.8% (respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would induce a 
flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate increase. This is dramatically 
illustrated by the dyn mics of  reserve f d. For the bench ark sc nario, it increases fr m zero (right 
vertical axis) to reach in 2026 a maximum of about 18 B€. Over this period, the pension scheme yields a 
surplus. Then it decreases – deficit period – to reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again 
– second period of surplus – and cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the 
“prudent” scenario: in 2030 it reaches a maximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of about –27 B€ in 2057. 
This differenc  is due to the fact that, in ord r to com ly with a less optimistic forecast, larger amounts of 
money must be saved.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
•	 lower public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b and Figure 7b) 
with 
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We consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
reference values of parameters: 50=0.5,= Tα  and 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (r spectively 3.6%) reduction  pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adju t ent with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
incre se. This is dram tically illu trated by  dynamics of the r serve fund. For the be chmark 
sc nario, it increases from zer right vertical axi ) to reach in 2026 a max m of ab ut 18 B€. 
Over this p riod, the pension scheme yields surplus. Then it decreas s – deficit p riod – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second p riod of surplu  – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the “prudent” scenario: in 
2030 it reaches a aximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of about –27 B€ in 2057. This 
diff rence is due to the fact that, in order to comply with a less o timistic forecast, [contrib tors 
must]  “save” larg r am unts of money.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• lower public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost through receipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public preference for the present rate ( 0%=δ ) increases the cost of 
procrastination. It results in stronger adjustments in the short run and weaker adjustments in 
•	 lower distortion cost through receipts with 
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We consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
reference values of parameters: 50=0.5,= Tα  and 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increas  of tax rate. In the lo g ru , th se adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment wit  a 2.8% (6.3%) p nsion reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
increase. This is dra atically illustrated by the dynamics of the res rve fund. For the benchmark 
scenario, it increases from zero (right vertical axis) to reach in 2026 a maximum of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pension scheme yields a surplus. Then it decreases – deficit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second period of surplu  – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the “prudent” scenario: in 
2030 it reaches a maximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of about –27 B€ in 2057. This 
difference is due to the fact that, in order to comply with a less optimistic forecast, [contributors 
must]  “save” larger amounts of money.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• low  public pr ference f r th  presen  rate, inducing less pr crastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower disto tion cost thr ugh r ceipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c  7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public preference for the present rate ( 0%=δ ) increases the cost of 
procrastination. It results in stronger adjustments in the short run and weaker adjustments in 
(Figures 6c and 7c)
•	 shorter forecast horizon with 
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We consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
reference values of parameters: 50=0.5,= Tα  and 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
increas . This is drama ically illustrated by the ynamics of the reserve fund. For the benchmark 
scenario, it increases from zero (right vertical axis) to reach in 2026 a maximum of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pension scheme yields a surplus. Then it decreases – deficit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second period of surplus – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dyn mic over a larger ra e prev ils in the “prudent” sc nario: in 
2030 i  reaches a maximum of about 9  B€ an  a minimum of bout –27 B€ in 2057. Thi  
difference is du  to the fact that, in ord r to comply with a less optimistic forecast, [contributors 
must]  “s v ” larger amounts of mon y.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• l wer public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost through receipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower p blic prefere ce for the p esent rate ( 0%=δ ) i creases the cost of 
pr crastina ion. It resul s in stronger djus ments in the short r n and weaker adjustments in
 (Figures 6d and 7d).
this effect, Gannon et al. (2013) build a model based on dynamic programming called “smooth 
automatic balance mechanism” (S-ABM). The “socio-political” sensitivity to changes in 
legislation is apprehended by a quadratic loss function. The distortion cost of the receipts (resp. 
of the expenditures) is given a weighting2 α  (resp. )1 α− . At period ,t  the loss function ( tLF
) can be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .111= 22 −⋅−+−⋅ ttt BALF αα  (8)
F r  forecast horizon ,T  the S-ABM aims to match the s m of discoun ed receipts with 
the sum of discounted expenditures: 
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The authors assume that the social planner has a time preferen e. By enoting δ  the 
public preference for present rate, the dynamic program to optimise is: 
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 The first order conditions lead to the initial optimal values 1A  and 1B , which are 
functions of the unfunded obligations: 
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 The dynamics of the adjustm t factors can be inferred for 2≥t : 
2 For the sake of simplicity, we e the same notation as that us d f r the TGR adjustm nts because in he presentation of simulation results, 
the parameter values are the same for the two ABMs: TGR and S-ABM.
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 The dynamics of the adjustment factors can be inferred for 2≥t : 
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the parameter values are the same for the two ABMs: TGR and S-ABM.
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We consider two successive scenarios: the benchmark scenario without UI transfer 
(Figure 6) and the prudent scenario (Figure 7). Figures 6a and 7a provide the simulations for the 
reference values of parameters: 50=0.5,= Tα  and 2.5%=δ . Assuming the benchmark 
(resp. respectively prudent) scenario, Figure 6a (resp. respectively Figure 7a) shows that 
immediate adjustments imply both a 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% 
(resp. respectively 3.5%) increase of tax rate. In the long run, these adjustments reach 4.8% 
(resp. respectively 9.1%) and 4.5% (resp.respectively 9.1%). In comparison, a TGR-ABM would 
induce a flat adjustment with a 2.8% (6.3%) pension reduction and 2.9% (6.7%) tax rate 
increase. This is dramatically illustrated by the dynamics of the reserve fund. For the benchmark 
scenario, it increases from zero (right vertical axis) to reach in 2026 a maximum of about 18 B€. 
Over this period, the pension scheme yields a surplus. Then it decreases – deficit period – to 
reach in 2048 a minimum of –60 B€. It finally grows again – second period of surplus – and 
cancels out in 2063. A similar dynamic over a larger range prevails in the “prudent” scenario: in 
2030 it reaches a maximum of about 93 B€ and a minimum of about –27 B€ in 2057. This 
difference is due to the fact that, in order to comply with a less optimistic forecast, [contributors 
must]  “save” larger amounts of money.
We evaluate three parametric variants:
• lower public preference for the present rate, inducing less procrastination (Figure 6b 
and Figure 7b) with 0%=δ
• lower distortion cost through receipts with 0.25=α  (Figures 6c and 7c) 
• shorter forecast horizon with 25=T  (Figures 6d and 7d).
A lower public preference for th present rate ( 0%=δ ) increases the cost of 
procrastination. It results in stronger adjustments in the short run and weaker adjustments in 
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when growth rates of expenditures and receipts are very close to the interest rate , net of the 
public preference for the present rate (compare with the dynamics of adjustment factors). By 
contrast, Figure 7b shows a more pronounced decrease in factors. This property results from 
the fact that the long-run growth rates of expenditures and receipts are lower than the interest 
rate, net of the public preference for the present rate. Larger immediate adjusments result in 
more savings being accumulated over a longer period.
Figures 6c and 7c illustrate the fact that a lower distortion cost through receipts (
0.25)=α (α=0.25) implies a higher adjustment cost through expenditures. Not surprisingly, the 
adjustment factor of expenditures is reduced, while the adjustment factor of receipts is higher. 
The profile of the reserve fund is little modified because there is mainly an intratemporal 
balancing effort from expenditures over receipts.
A shorter forecast horizon ( 25=T ) means lower unfunded obligations. It results in lower levels 
of adjustment factors (Figures 6d and 7d). It follows that this shrinks the range of the reserve 
fund.  
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eans lower unfunded obligations. It re ults in lower levels of 
adjustment facto s (Figures 6d and 7d). It follows that this shrinks the range of th  reserve fund. 
4 ConCLusion
In this paper, we hav  studied how using ABMs cou d en ur  financial stability of the French first pillar 
pension system for private sector employees (CNAV). Two scenarios are considered, respectively optimistic 
(benchmark) and pessimistic (or prudent). The use of ABMs can be particularly useful to set the pension 
scheme on “auto-pilot” (Bosworth & Weaver 2011) so as to avoid systematic and wasteful political debates 
about adopting reforms to restore solvency.
Unsurprisingly, our results stress that the governance of the CNAV ay require significant reductions 
in pensions and a higher contribution rate.
In the special case of a flat adjustment obtained with TGR-ABM, this requires, for the benchmark 
(respectively prudent) scenario, a significant 2.8% (respectively 6.3%) reduction in pensions and a 2.9% 
(respectively 6.7%) rise in the contribution rate.
If the ruling authority (the government) seeks slower and smoother changes, it may set adjustment 
rules based upon a smooth ABM (S-ABM). For the benchmark (respectively prudent) scenario, such rules 
imply an immediate 1.5% (respectively 3.6%) reduction in pensions and a 1.4% (respectively 3.5%) increase 
in the tax rate. In the long run (50 years), such rules imply a 4.8% (respectively 9.1%) reduction in pensions 
and a 4.5% (respectively 9.1%) increase in the tax rate.
Obviously, the scope of our simulations is limited, since they are based only on two alternative forecasts 
(pessimistic versus optimistic). A natural extension of our analysis could consist of stochastic simulations, 
which would capture a larger distribution of possible adjustments.
appendix: an oVerView oF the Caisse NatioNale d’assuraNCe Vieillesse 
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The pay-as-you-go public pension regimes represent 14.5% of the French GDP and around 97.8% of 
retirees’ revenues. The average direct pension (that is, excluding widows’ and orphans’ pensions) is close to 
1250 euros per month, 1600 for males and 900 for females.
In this paper, we focus on private sector (around 70% of the workers) pensions and on the basic pension 
scheme, CNAV, which provides an average pension of 641 euros per month (in 2012).
The Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse (CNAV) was set up in 1945. In 1999, there was an attempt to 
create a reserve fund in addition to the pay-as-you-go component. It was a failure, because the accumulated 
funds are not very high and hardly compensate for past deficits. So, CNAV can be considered as a fully 
pay-as-you-go scheme.
CNAV individual pensions are computed as follows (Gannon & Touzé 2013): 
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 where:
• cnavP  is the yearly amount of CNAV pension (paid monthly);
• w  is the so-called “reference wage”:, it is a yearly wage computed as the 25 best wages 
(under the “social security ceiling”) brought up to date according to the price index;3
• λ  is called the pension ratio, less than a maximum of 50%;4
• T  is the number of years contributed by a given individual;
3 It is bound to the “social security ceiling” so that the pension is, in fact, proportional to the fraction of the wage lower than or equal to the 
social security ceiling. In 2014, the “social security ceiling” is valued at 37 548 euros per year or 3129 euros per month.
4 This means that, if an individual fulfils all the conditions laid down by the scheme’s rules, then his maximum pension provided by CNAV is 50% 
of the social security ceiling.
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of the social security ceiling.
                                                
 is the number of years contributed y a given individual;
•	  '  is t  minimum number of years contribut d which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a f ll-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in c se they hav n  reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination betw en T  and 'T  appli s twice: first, to co ute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
is the mini u  number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate pension  
(Table A1);
•	
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age w en people must retire if 
they want o draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case th y ave n t r ached the 
minimum c nt ibutive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effect ve retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, t  compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equa ion A2) if the individual ha  ot con ributed during the period set by the cheme’s 
rules, the pension ra io is lowered whenever the individual has not waite  until he as reach d 
the age “ FRA “. Second, t  compute th  pension per se (equati n A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. N te that individuals ca not retir  before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, thos who have
worked before 20 and have complet d 'T  e s of employment, and therefore c ntributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributiv  period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  a d 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of th reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the refer nce wage;
o if the individual retir s at th  automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the mi imum contributive p riod, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
at cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference w ge;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly iscount is applied to λ  and the p o rata temporis is applied to the 
downgr ded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
is the full retirem nt age (Table A1), that is, the ge when people must retire if they want to 
draw a full-rate pension (
• 'T  is the minimum umber of years contributed which is required to draw a full ra e
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they wan  to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) i  case hey ha  not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the sche e’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
 i  case they h ve not reached the minimum contributive period;
•	
 'T  is the minimum number of y ars contribute  which is required o draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
 FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive pe iod;
 ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The comb ation betwe n T  and 'T  a plies twice: first, t  compute the p nsion ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension rati  is lo red whe ever the individual has no  waited until he ha  reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension p r se (equa ion A1) b cause the pension i  
paid pro rata temporis. N te that individuals can ot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
ev n if they have reached 'T , unl ss they ar  very early workers (that is, thos  who have 
worked before 20 and have complet  'T  years of mployment, and ther fore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/T , meaning that 
cnavP  s 5  of the r ferenc  w ge;
if t  i i i l r tir s t t  t ti  f ll r t   ( )  s not reached 
the ini um contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid p o r a t mporis nd less than 50% of the reference wage;
if t  i i i l r tir  when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, t n, 
a 5% yearly discount is ppli d t  λ  and the pro r ta temporis is applied to the 
downgrade v lu  of λ  so t at the pension is well below 50% of the v rage 
wage.  
is the individual’s effectiv  retir m nt age. 
The combination betwe n 
• 'T  is the minimum nu ber of years contri uted which is required to draw a full ate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement ge (Table A1), that i , the age w n peopl  must retire if 
they want to dr w a full-rate pen ion ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA is the individual’s effectiv  reti ment age. 
The co bi ati n etween T  and '  pplies twic : first, to compute the nsion ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by th  schem ’s 
rules, the p nsion ratio is lowered when ver the individual has not w ited until he has reac ed 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pen ion r se (equation A1) bec use the pension is 
paid pro rata tem oris. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are v ry early workers (that i , t ose who ave 
worked befor  20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributi s).
Four cases can be descri :
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (se  also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wag ;
o if the ind vidual ret res at th  aut matic full r e age ( FRA ) and has reac ed the 
minimum contributive p riod, th  50%=λ  an  100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the ind vidual retires at the automatic full r e age ( FRA ) and has not re ch d 
the mini um contribu ive period, th n 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is pai  pro r a emporis and les  than 50% of th  reference wage;
o if the individual ret res when he or she has no  re ched these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is pplied o λ  and the pro rata temporis is a plied to the 
downgra ed value of λ  so that t e pension is w ll belo  50  f the av ag  
wage.  
and 
• 'T  is the mi imum number of years ntributed w ich is required t  draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirem nt age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want o draw a f ll-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case th y have not reached the 
minim m contr b tiv  pe od;
• ERA  is th  indiv dual’s effectiv  re ir ment age. 
The combi tion between T  and 'T  applie  t ice: f rst, o compute th  pensio  r tio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed u ng the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio i lower d when v r the i ividu l has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to comp te the pension per se (equation A1) because the p i n is
paid pro rat  temporis. N te that individu ls can ot retire befo  minimum ag  (Table A1) 
ev n if they h v  reached 'T , unl ss they are very e ly work rs (th t is, those who av  
worked before 20 and hav  complet d 'T  y ars of employment, and th r fore contrib tions).
Four case  can be d s ribed:
o if the individual ret res fter the minimum age (see Table A1) whil  having 
reached the minimum contrib tive pe od (s e als  Tabl 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/T , m a i g that cnavP  is 50% of the ref r nce wage;
o if the individual retires at th  automatic f ll rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contrib tive pe od, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/T , m ani g that 
cnavP  is 50% of the ref r nc  wa e;
o if the individual retires at th  automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimu  contrib tive p od, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/T , meani g 
that cnavP  is paid pro rat  t mporis and less th  50% of the r f r nce wage;
o if the indiv dual retires whe  he or s  h s not r ached th s  p riods/ages, the , 
a 5% yearly discou t is a plied to λ  an  the pro rat  t mporis applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the p nsi n is w l  bel w 50% of t  av rag  
wage.  
a lies twice: first, t  c mp te t e pension r tio 
• 'T  is th  minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
th y want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation 2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
th  ag  “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, those who have 
w rked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
t e minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
 (A2), if the
individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s rules, the pension ratio is lowered 
whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached the age “
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they wan  to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum con ributive period;
• ERA  is th  individual’s ffectiv  retirement age. 
Th  bi ation between T  an  'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual h s not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro r ta temporis. No e that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reach d 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if t e individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
”. Second, to c mpute the 
pension per se (A1) because the pension is paid pro ata temporis Note that individuals cannot retire 
before a minimum age (Table A1) even if they have reached 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (T ble A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), at is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a fu l-rate pensio  ( 0.5=λ ) i  case they have not reached the 
min mum ont ibut v  period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
Th combination etween T  an  'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equati n A2) if the individ al has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the ag  “ FRA “ Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
ev n if they ave r ached 'T , unless they are very early workers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Fou cases can be described:
o if th  individu l retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/T , eaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires a  the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
, unless they are ve y early workers 
that is, th se wh  hav  worked b for  20 d hav  c mpl e  
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum c ntribu ive period;
• ERA  is he in ividual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pensi  ratio is lowered wh never the individual has not waited until he has reached 
h  ag “ FRA “. Sec d, to com ute he p nsion p r s  ( quati n A1) because the pension is 
pa  pro rata temp is. Not  that individuals cannot retire b fore a mini um age (Table A1) 
ev n if they have r che  'T , unle s th y ar  very early work rs (that is, those wh  have 
w rked b for 20 a d ave m l t d 'T  ye rs of ployment, a d ther fore contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) a d has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the ref rence wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these p riods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the averag  
wag .  
 years of loy t, nd th r fore 
c ntributions).
Four cases can be described:
•	 if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having reached the 
minimum contributive period (see also Table A1), then 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people ust retire if 
they want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirem nt age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has n t contribut d during the period set by th  scheme’s
rules, the pension ratio is lowered when ver the indiv dual has not waited un il he has r ached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension p r se (equatio  A1) b cause th  pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. N te h t i divid als can t retir  before a minimum age (Tabl  A1) 
even if they have re ched 'T , unl ss they are very early work rs (that is, those who have 
worked befor  20 and have c mpleted 'T  years of employment, an  t ref re contributions).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the minimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimu  contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the refere ce wage;
o if the individu l retires at the autom tic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , e ning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the referenc  wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full r te age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive p riod, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individu l retires when he or she s not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is appli d to λ  and the pro rata te poris is applied to t e 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
and 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
t y want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s ffective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , ( quation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pensio  ratio is lowered wh never the individual has not waited until he has reached 
t  age “ FRA “. Second, to compute the pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Note that individuals can ot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
ev n if they h ve reached 'T , unless they are very early w rkers (that is, thos  who have 
w rked before 20 a d hav  completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases can be d scribed:
o if th  individual retires after the m nimum age (see Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributive period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if th individual retires at the autom tic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cn vP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the i ividual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the indivi ual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is appli  to λ  and the pro rata temporis is pplied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
, meaning 
that 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a full-rat  pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  app ies twic : first, to comput  t  pensio  ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed duri g th  period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered w never the individual as ot wai  until he has e ched 
the age “ FRA “. Second, t  comput  the pensi n per s  (equation A1) because the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. N e th t individ als cannot retire befor  a minimum age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unl ss th y are v ry early w rkers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have completed 'T  years of employment, and therefore contributions).
Four cases ca  be described:
o if the individu l eti es after t mi im m ag  (se  Table A1) while having 
reached  minimum ontributive period (see al o Table 2), th n 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meani g hat cnavP  is 50% f th  refer nc  w g ;
o if the individ l retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reach d the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the average 
wage.  
 50% of the r fe nce wag ;
•	 if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age (
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Tabl  A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to dr w a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) i  case they have not r ached the 
minimum contributiv  p riod;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combination between T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the p riod set by the scheme’s 
rules, the p nsion ratio is lowered wheneve  the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. S cond, to comput  the pension per se (equatio  A1) beca s  the pension is 
paid pro rata temporis. Not  that individuals cannot retir  fore a mi imum age (T ble A1) 
even if they av  r ached 'T , u l s t ey r  v ry arly wo k rs (th  i , os  who hav  
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owngraded value of  so at the pension is well below 50% of the ave age 
wage.  
) and has r ac ed the minimum 
contributive period, th n 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pe sion (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributiv  period;
• ERA  is the individual’  eff ctive retire ent age. 
The combination betwe n T  and 'T  applies twice: first, to compute t  pension ratio 
λ , (equation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, the pension ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Secon , to co put  th  p nsion per s  (equation A1) because t p sion is 
paid pro rata temp ris. Not  th t individuals can ot r tir  fore a minimum ag  (T ble A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , less hey ar  very early workers (that is, those who have 
worked before 20 and have co pleted 'T  years of em loyment, and th refo e contributi s).
Four cases can be described:
o if the individual retires after the mi imum age (s Table A1) while havi g 
reach d the minimum c ntributive period (s e also Table 2), th n 50%=λ  nd 
100%='/TT , mea ing that cnavP  is 50% of the reference w ge;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contribut ve period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate ag  ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum ontrib tiv  p riod, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata te poris and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual tires wh n he r she as not reached these periods/ag s, th , 
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the age “ FRA “. Second, to compute he pe sio  per se ( quation A1) because the pension is
paid pro rat  temporis. Note that individuals cannot retire before a minimum age (Table A1) 
ev n if they have reached 'T , unless they ar  very early workers (that is, those who have 
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rules, the p n ion ratio is lowered whenever the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the ag  “ FRA “. S cond, to comp te th pension per se (equation A1) because the pension is 
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o if the individ al r tires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has re ch d t  
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimu  contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/TT , meaning 
that cnavP  is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these peri ds/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  and the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pe sion is well below 50% of the averag  
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nd the pro rata temporis is appl ed to th  owngraded value of 
• 'T  is the minimum number of years contributed which is required to draw a full rate 
pension (Table A1);
• FRA  is the full retirement age (Table A1), that is, the age when people must retire if 
they want to draw a full-rate pension ( 0.5=λ ) in case they have not reached the 
minimum contributive period;
• ERA  is the individual’s effective retirement age. 
The combina ion between T  and 'T  applies twic : first, to compute the pension ratio 
λ , (eq ation A2) if the individual has not contributed during the period set by the scheme’s 
rules, th  pension ratio is lowered when ver the individual has not waited until he has reached 
the age “ FRA “. Second, to comput  the pension per se ( quation A1) because the pension is 
paid pr  r a temp ris. No e that individuals cannot retir  befor  a minimu  age (Table A1) 
even if they have reached 'T , unless they are very early workers ( at is, tho  who have 
worke  before 20 a d ve c mpleted 'T  years of mployment, and therefore contributions).
F u  cas s c n b  d sc i d:
if the i dividual r tires aft r the minimum age (s e Table A1) while having 
reached the minimum contributiv  period (see also Table 2), then 50%=λ  and 
100%='/TT , meaning that cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has reached the 
minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%='/TT , meaning that 
cnavP  is 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires at the automatic full rate age ( FRA ) and has not reached 
the minimum contributive period, then 50%=λ  and 100%<'/T , meaning 
that cnavP is paid pro rata temporis and less than 50% of the reference wage;
o if the individual retires when he or she has not reached these periods/ages, then, 
a 5% yearly discount is applied to λ  nd the pro rata temporis is applied to the 
downgraded value of λ  so that the pension is well below 50% of the verage 
w g .  
 so 
that the pension is well below 50% of the average wage. 
In 2003, a pre iu  was introduced in order to pro ide som  incentives for people to work lat r. This 
premium amount to 3% of the pension the first year, 4% over the following thre  years and 5% in the fifth 
year if the individual is aged more tha  65.
The last 2012 forecasts (Cons il d’orientation des retraites, 2012) hav  evidenced th  emergency of core 
adjustments to guarantee sustainability of the French pension system. 
Under this constraint, he Ayrault go e nment has taken measures in 2 3. A 0.6 point i crease i   
the contribution rate, paid equally by workers and mployers, is scheduled b tween 2014 and 2017, in 
order to restore the CNAV financial balance. Hence, for each of them, he contribution rate will increase  
by 0.3 points. If there are no other adjustments, the wage earners’ contribution rate will reach 6.40% of  
the wage under the ceiling, plus 0.40% of their total wage, and the employers’ co tribution will be 8.45%  
of the bounded wage plus 1.90% of the total wage.
This last 2013 reform also includes a “hardship account”, the purpose of which is to compensate for 
the tediousness of cert n jobs through an early retirement or a training period. Please n te t at our 
simulations do not take account of the cos s induced by this acc unt.
3 it is bound to the “social security ceiling” so that the pension is, in fact, proportional to the fraction of the wage lower than or equal to the 
social security ceiling. in 2014, the “social security ceiling” is valued at 37 548 euros per year or 3129 euros per month.
4 this means that, if an individual fulfils all the conditions laid down by the scheme’s rules, then his maximum pension provided by CNav is 
50% of the social security ceiling.
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Table A1: Minimum ages and contributive periods for PAYGO basic pension scheme after the 2013 reform
Birth year T’ : minimum contributive
period (years) 
Application year Minimum age FRA (full retirement
age) 
before 1944 37.5 Before 2004 60 65
1944 38.0 2004 60 65
1945 38.5 2005 60 65
1946 39.0 2006 60 65
1947 39.5 2007 60 65
1948 40.0 2008 60 65
1949 40 + 1 q.* 2009 60 65
1950 40 + 2 q. 2010 60 65
1951  40 + 3 q. 2011 60 65
1951 40 + 3 q. 2011 60 + 4 m.† 65 + 4 m.
1952 41.0 2012 60 + 9 m. 65 + 9 m.
1953 41 + 1 q. 2014 61 + 2 m. 66 + 2 m.
1954 41 + 1 q. 2015  61 + 7 m. 66 + 7 m.
1955 41 + 1 q. 2017 62 67
1956 41 + 1 q. 2018 62 67
1957 41 + 1 q. 2019 62 67
1958 41 + 3 q. 2020 62 67
1961 42.0 2023 62 67
1964 42 + 1 q. 2026 62 67
1967 42.5 2029 62 67
1970 42 + 3 q. 2032 62 67
1973 43.0 2035 62 67
*  q. = quarter 
†  m. = month
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